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Introduction
The Kurdish question is one of the most long-standing issues in Turkey's politics. In the early 2000s, with the Turkey-EU accession negotiations ahead, the ceasefire of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers' Party), and the coming to power of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party), a range of political reforms were introduced, which allowed a more peaceful atmosphere to prevail in the Kurdish-inhabited provinces of Turkey's Southeast. These developments, as well as the Kurdish party's success in the municipal elections in the region, allowed for a re-orientation in the political organization of the Kurdish movement over the past decade. Indeed, while no longer in control of the region by means of arms, the Kurdish movement, with the PKK being the principal actor, has reinforced its presence. This article discusses these new realities through the prism of the developments following the elections of March 2009. These developments, so we will argue, testify to different attempts of government and state institutions to contain and roll back this political and societal influence of the PKK in the southeastern, predominantly Kurdish-inhabited provinces. We will argue that, alarmed by the election outcome, the ruling party (AKP) and state officials responded in two ways. The first was to launch the Kurdish initiative, challenging the PKK and its affiliated organizations as well as the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic Society Party) both politically and ideologically; the second was the upsurge in judicial investigations and arrests of activists deemed to be PKK members, in order to crack down on its urban wings. The elections and government-initiated constitutional reforms, as well as the waves of arrest will be discussed in the context of the ways of dealing with the Kurdish issue.
Towards the end of its second term in power, the AKP embarked on a major new round of constitutional changes seemingly aimed at a reform of the Turkish political system in 2010. This effort, however, did not win the backing of the main Kurdish party, the BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, Peace and Democracy Party), even though the changes had been prompted, at least in part, by the controversial court ban on the BDP's predecessor, the DTP, earlier that year. This ruling appeared to undermine an attempt of the government to deal with the Kurdish problem; yet, a key element of the government's proposed reforms, an amendment to limit the ability of the courts to ban political parties, was rejected in parliament.
1 Secularists rejected constitutional reforms, considering them an attack on the judiciary, one of the bastions of Turkish nationalist secular republicanism (Kemalism), and believed that the executive (the AKP government) was seeking to gain control over the courts as part of its unstated ("hidden") agenda of Islamification. 2 This struggle for the state and the balance of power between its different institutions was of less relevance to the BDP, which rejected the proposed changes because it conceived of them as lacking concessions and changes to its aims. Thus, while recent developments related to Turkey's Kurdish issue can be represented as a bivalent political play of regional (Kurdish) versus state (Turkish) interests, they can also be placed in a triangular nexus of relations between three sets of actors: those of the traditional statist institutions (primarily the Turkish Armed Forces and judiciary, ideologically represented as "Kemalists"), the AKP government (and more widely the parliamentary party, the party as a whole and the "Islamist" movement that it represents), and the "pro-Kurdish" organizations (including the PKK and the legal BDP, referred to as "the Kurdish The PKK return initiative was quickly halted, and the Kurdish opening rephrased as a project of national unity, subsumed under a wider "democratic" initiative aimed to include recognition of (some) other minorities and minority rights within the traditionally nonpluralist Turkish state system (and extended also to a normalization and improvement of relations with the country's eastern neighbors). Nevertheless, the government had made it clear that it was searching for a new way of defining the Kurdish issue . However, even as it attempted to initiate this break with traditional statist ideologyand in the midst of apparent competition, rather than cooperation with the Kurdish movement-the AKP was unable to control the official narrative. Government ministers instead found themselves having to respond to new moves from the security forces and 5 'Erdoğan makes emotional appeal for unity on Kurdish initiative ', Today's Zaman, August 12, 2009. 6 A total of 34 persons, of which eight were PKK guerrillas from the Qandil mountains and 26 from the Mahmur refugee camp in Northern Iraq, entered Turkey as a "peace group" at the border town of Silopi. The group members were welcomed by several ten thousand enthusiastic Kurds making victory signs in a welcoming ceremony organized by the Kurdish legal party DTP. Mayors and parliamentarians from DTP attended the ceremony. 7 Yeğen distinguishes three major periods in the state's preception f the Kurdish issue: pre-denial, denial, and post-denial. He argues that the AKP government is searching for a new approach and "the year 2009 has opened with some major steps toward the politics of recognition", however "though some important steps have been taken on the road to recognition, the And yet, crucial as it was, the election in Diyarbakır was little different from others in the area. Basically, third parties were squeezed out of the track in a two-horse race. would seem that, when people were forced to choose between the AKP and the PKK, they went for the latter, expressed at the ballot box through support for the DTP.
Local Institutionalization of the Kurdish Movement
Large parts of the Southeast have been under the ideological influence of the PKK since the end of the 1980s-and for part of that time it was even controlled by its guerillas. apparatus. Although ethnic Kurds had long been represented in Turkey's political system, it was only now that they were able to assert Kurdish claims. were accused of membership of the Turkey Council of the KCK.
The KCK in Turkey is active in several spheres of public life. It has a legal committee, which is involved in the establishment of local councils (at village, quarter, and city level), "people's courts," a committee for civil society organizations that implements projects to activate civil society, and a language and education committee responsible for implementing projects to develop the usage of Kurdish as a written language. An important concept in the KCK is that of the "free citizen" (özgür yurttaş). The free citizen concept includes basic civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech and organization, but also freedom of ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic identity, and the freedom to develop a cultural and national identity. 30 Taking the concept of free citizen as a starting point, the KCK is considered to be the architect of the free municipality model (özgür belediyecilik modeli), adopted by the DTP at a three-day conference in February 2008; it aims to realize a bottom-up participative administrative body, from local to provincial levels. 31 The KCK and the free municipality model are both to be understood in terms of the "democratic triangle" concept developed by intended to function as a "strategic dispositive," as institutional and ideological capabilitythat is, to orient and organize Kurdish political demands (and thereby resolve the problem in Turkey's Southeast). According to this ideology, the democratic triangle should be composed of three interrelated projects: the democratic republic, democratic autonomy, and democratic confederalism.
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The project for a democratic republic aims at the establishment of a new, reformed republic with equal rights for all citizens. It is in the context of this project that the drafting of a new constitution became a tangible political demand on the part of the Kurdish movement.
In the constitution of the Republic of Turkey, citizenship has been equated with Turkishness, 34 historically making Kurds invisible. 35 A new constitution, it follows, has to define citizenship in civil terms. While the project of the democratic republic centers on individual rights, the project of democratic autonomy focuses on the collective rights of the population. Both cultural and religious rights are conceived of as forms of such collective rights. Finally, democratic confederalism is a project for local self-organization. Referring among others to Murray Bookchin, this democratic confederalism is described as an alternative project of democratization, one which is to be organized bottom-up, from the local level. 36 It was this "democratic triangle" project which implied that political and ideological struggles be given priority over armed conflict, developments confirmed in 2009 through one of the main PKK militant-activist magazines Serxwebun.
Fuelled, among other things, by Turkey's desire to become a member of the European Union and the reform requirements attendant upon this, public discussion about individual and collective rights has flourished during the past decade. The drafting of a new constitution had become a vigorously debated issue, and the issue of cultural rights was to be a cornerstone of the government's Kurdish opening, to which we will turn in the following sections. For the PKK, however, it is democratic confederalism that has been the key project, envisaging, as it does, not only a grand program for a societal configuration beyond the nation-state, but also a clear project for local organization. The recent waves of arrests were thus also aimed at preventing further implementation of these kinds of concepts and projects, by taking down the KCK. damage done to the KCK by the waves of arrests seems to have had little immediate impact on the BDP polling booth performance, judging from the referendum outcome in 2010 (in which the BDP consolidated its electoral support).
A more refined approach would enable us to observe the distinction between legal and illegal Kurdish parties, but without separating them from each other. We argue that the KCK has been instrumental in the regional development of DTP/BDP strategy, and that organizationally they are overlapping entities. This means that it is difficult to make the simple differentiation necessary in order to ascribe electoral success to one as opposed to the other.
The Government Response: The Kurdish Opening
Some analysts consider the AKP's democratic initiative as dating back a decade and tied to Turkey's accession process to the EU, which is reasonable, but little ingenuous. 38 It can also be argued that what actually happened, as explained above, was that the government embarked on its Kurdish opening only after the DTP's local election success, but then drew back and instead diluted it into a "democratic" opening. The current Kurdish initiative, therefore, looks more like an ad hoc process of politicking than a considered culmination of years of preparation. The best AKP revisionist apology was the initiative going back to a few comments made by Erdoğan in support of the Kurdish cause in Diyarbakır, in 2005. But the very fact that these were not followed up until two years later-that is, until after the DTP's victory-rather disproves that argument.
What the Kurdish initiative was intended to achieve exactly remains unclear, leading to discussions over whether there actually was a clear package or plan. 39 Thus, it still remains far from apparent whether the government even has any explicit strategy at all, or where the Kurdish opening as announced fits into its policy. This fudging, in fact, gives support to the Kurdish nationalist claim that they determine the political discourse, with the AKP primarily reacting to them-which would be no shame in a genuinely pluralistic democracy able to embrace an internal ethno-nationalist cause, but it is not something that the AKP has appeared very willing or able to accept. In order to understand the government initiative without the luxury of a clear-cut policy document, therefore, we need to draw inferences and generalize from the process as it has emerged.
In terms of substance, what seems apparent is that measures were to be promoted towards (1) ending outstanding restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language (such as the lack of Kurdish Studies departments at universities), without allowing for it to achieve the status of a second official language (thus making it unacceptable as a medium for education at primary or secondary schools); (2) The prime objective of the AKP government in the Kurdish part of its democratic initiative, therefore, may be understood as aiming to combat the PKK at the ideological level. This is a battle for "hearts and minds" and, indeed, for "souls." The AKP has a "natural" constituency in the Southeast-as earlier elections in particular have shown 41 -and does not want to lose this to the Kurdish movement which, by its very foregrounding of ethnicity, denies the primacy of Islam. References from leading government figures to "our Kurdish brothers" (Kürt kardeşlerimiz) typifies the AKP refashioning of an old discourse to frame this matter-that is, invoking the religious claim to unity, but with the modern slant of a stated ethnicity.
Notwithstanding these considerations, however, the determining realpolitik of the system within which the AKP operates has the ballot box as its ultimate sanction. This is revealed by the government's failure to address the national electoral threshold (by lowering it from 10 percent to the European norm of 3-5 percent). The omission of this from the proposed constitutional changes thus condemns the AKP to the straight-forward charge of political selfinterest. They do not want to risk their parliamentary majority, which would be the likely result of the lowering of the 10-percent threshold. This would triple the number of BDP MPs in Turkey's General Assembly to 60.
Recognizing that there is "a Kurdish issue" and promising to change some of the conditions that have given rise to it has been an enormous step forward for the country. The AKP initiative, however, has represented an attempt to define this issue on its own terms and thus set its own agenda for a solution, primarily not by following the religious line, but actually very much like previous Turkish governments did in the 1990s. 43 The official AKP 
AKP Versus the Kurdish Movement
The Kurdish initiative has been undertaken with a conscious disregard of the social and political presence of the Kurdish movement. It is true that the government faces fierce opposition to the idea of negotiation with the PKK, the "code" of staying in power, which has meant avoiding conflict with the secular bloc led by the military and the judiciary.
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Nevertheless, these considerations are, in our opinion, not sufficient to explain the AKP's approach to the Kurdish question. The party has become so dominant in Turkish politics, occupying the vast center ground of moderate religious conservatism and commanding such a large parliamentary majority, that it not only had the power to instigate an initiative addressing the issue in the Southeast, but also had to go to quite radical lengths to solve it. We believe that there are other reasons why the government has lacked incentive, which thus provide a fuller explanation of the current approach.
There has never been a cooperative relationship between the ruling party and the means to achieve this, such as the emphasis on local service provisions, and the establishment of relationships between politicized civil society associations and party-friendly entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and the constituents on the other.
Interestingly, both the AKP and the PKK claim to be the architects of Turkish democratization and consequently determining the future resolution of the Kurdish question:
the AKP from Ankara through the Kurdish initiative, the PKK from the Southeast through the democratic triangle concept. Neither one would happily tolerate the other's claim to credit or usurpation of authority in democratic improvements. Undoubtedly this constitutes an obstacle for any kind of negotiations between these political actors. Although having pushed for reforms, the way in which the AKP framed these reforms is complicating its own capability of transforming Turkey's political system. Indeed, the AKP government's signature is a series of reforms. As a result of these reforms, Turkey sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria and accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU, which had been started in 2005.
However, facing severe opposition from the radical secular and nationalist camp, the AKP defended these reforms mainly in reference to a desired integration of the country into the EU.
Moreover, the AKP presented itself as the party protecting democracy, and not necessarily as the party transforming the political system in the direction of a liberal democracy. In other words, the AKP framed its policies in a technocratic way: defending them with reference to the European Union, and not based on a deepening of the awareness that the political system in Turkey truly needed radical reforms. This is what Çınar calls the "anti-political agenda of political reform" of the AKP, as a result of which the party is not able to "pursue consistently a reformist agenda" (Çınar 2011: 13, 22 Jongerden, 13-27. (New York: Routledge, 2011) .
Crucially important as this struggle for authority between the political actors is in terms of practical politics, even more fundamental is the difference in how the two sides wish to achieve political change. Both the Kurdish movement and the conservative democrats of the AKP seek to transform socio-political life by engaging in the transformation of the individual and society. A better society is sought through change at several levels, including the most intimate level of the lives of their supporters. However, whereas AKP supporters are called upon to meet their individual responsibilities as devout Muslims displaying piety, the PKK ultimately seeks change through the personal transformation of its followers into "new men" or "new women"-that is, men and women dedicated to the PKK's "revolution" for liberty and socialism, for whom following the PKK's ideology is considered the means to free themselves from their subordinate position.
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"Born from the left," the Kurdish movement has conceived of itself from the outset as a modern and revolutionary force for change, intent on doing away with traditional structures of socio-political organization. 49 The conservative AKP constitutes a threat to this transformational project. This goes to the heart of the very real gulf that exists between the competing forces, beyond differences of emphasis or orientation, or the power politics of a turf war. Very much like the secularist opposition of the CHP to the current trend in Turkey's social and political life, the Kurdish movement as a whole is deeply suspicious of and opposed to the basic direction of cultural change in the country, and the socio-political direction in which the government is going. 48 For a more detailed account, see Olivier Grojean, 'La production de l'Homme nouveau au sein du PKK'.
Containment Through Counter-Terrorism
The state institutions, still dominated by hard-line Kemalists-such as public prosecutors, the military, and the higher echelons of civilian bureaucracy-continue to perceive the problem primarily in terms of "terrorism" and respond by means of "hard politics. the part of state officials to undermine the functioning of the Kurdish-party-run municipalities, especially given the importance of aid programs for the ruling political actors to win over the local population.
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In respect of the recent arrests, the security analysis has the KCK depicted as a modernized urban expression of terrorism, clandestinely spreading fear through the region's local authorities, hospitals, universities, and the like. The arrests have generally been portrayed as necessary in the struggle against PKK "terrorism," 54 a policy sustained by the governing party, the opposition parties, and the military and judiciary. The main concern is to take away the "root causes" of terrorism, but the current containment politics also attest to the growing recognition that the PKK insurgency cannot be ended by mere military operations.
Rather than risking the lives of more Turkish soldiers in the mountainous hinterlands, the aim is to roll back the PKK presence in social and political, primarily urban life. However, the The closure of the DTP in particular deeply dismayed many in the country. Even
Prime Minister Erdoğan was moved to speak out against it. For their part, the PKK and the political party and organizations associated with it have responded to the government and state attempts to contain their presence in different ways. In response to the AKP, the PKK leadership first pushed forward its own roadmap in an effort to set the conditions for peace and to position itself as a principal actor in the solution process. The physical copy of this has never seen the light of day, after being "lost" in the corridors of power around the time when the AKP launched its Kurdish opening. The next PKK move was to send a group of peace negotiators from Northern Iraq to act as go-betweens, presumably with a level of collusion from government agencies, a move that offered high hopes for a few days before failing. The PKK roadmap has been neglected since that episode.
In response to the judiciary's operations against its organizational bodies, the PKK leadership in the mountains has continued to call on young people to join the ranks of the guerilla in order to prepare in case of future military operations, and in an attempt to demonstrate to the Turkish state and military that it is still capable of doing so. The PKK retains the threat of renewed violence, should progress continue to be thwarted. 55 As for the PKK, its holding on to arms is generally conceived as a means to secure its political survival as well as that of the political struggle with which it is engaged through the KCK and the DTP/BDP. The PKK has, over the past years, never ceased to recruit new Kurdish youth into its ranks, 56 displaying an ongoing distrust towards the Turkish state apparatus and government of the day. The official position maintained by the PKK-namely, a unilateral ceasefire with the right to "self-defense" in case of attack-becomes more appealing to young Kurds with the crackdown on the legal wing of the movement.
Future Prospects
Given the deep, established fault lines between the Kurdish movement and the AKP, the future promises ongoing political-ideological struggles that are constitutive also of the ongoing identity-formation of the followers and converts of the two movements. This become increasingly mutually exclusive, 58 especially if the AKP fails to take the lead and embark on the radical route forward that will be necessary to finally bring the PKK down from the mountains and achieve real peace.
The ongoing counter-terrorism operations of the state, on the other hand, are far more dangerous since they reinforce those voices within the Kurdish movement that would rather fight their way out of the ongoing repression against their movement, having lost hope for a political solution and believing that a solution can only be found by means of armed struggle.
This would mean a rise in armed clashes, possibly leading to a renewed period of warfare between PKK insurgents and the Turkish Armed Forces, giving rise to increased Turkish and Kurdish nationalism and even raising the specter of communal violence between Turks and Kurds in the country's largest cities, which host large numbers of Kurdish migrants and internally displaced people. Failure of the government's initiative will only profit the security forces looking for a modus operandi with which to reassert authority in the country. The AKP has brought this danger on itself insofar as it has sought to embrace the Kurds and the multicultural reality of the country, while disregarding the societal and political presence of the Kurdish movement. 58 In this context, one recalls former DTP co-chair Emine Ayna's statement before the 2009 election, that "those who vote for the AKP cannot be Kurds."
